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ABSTRACT 
The vulnerability of the Aviation Transportation System was once again 
highlighted on September 11, 2001.  Hijacking was not a new phenomenon in aviation; it 
erupted in the late 1960s, hijackers used commercial airliners for transportation to Cuba.  
The hijack incidents slowly became more violent.  Aviation security legislation and 
measures were championed after each major aviation hijack incident, but they were not 
always fully implemented.  What was the status of aviation security leading up to 9/11?  
Have the improvements made to the Aviation Transportation System since 9/11 made the 
system less vulnerable? 
This thesis presents a comparative study of domestic aviation security measures 
applied to commercial passenger aviation.  Security initiatives, the implementation of 
those initiatives, and security policies both pre and post 9/11 are described and examined 
in an effort to determine if the domestic Aviation Transportation System is more secure 
now than it was prior to September 11.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis examines domestic aviation security measures that have been 
implemented since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the Unites States.  The 
purpose is to determine if the domestic Aviation Transportation System is more secure 
now than it was prior to September 11.   
B. BACKGROUND 
By 8:00 A.M. on the morning of September 11, 2001, nineteen hijackers had 
defeated the civil aviation security measures that America had in place in order to prevent 
a hijacking.1 
The 9/11 Commission made multiple recommendations in their report including 
gaining international support to counter terrorism and track terrorist financing, stopping 
the spread of weapons of mass destruction, improvements to border security, emergency 
disaster response improvements, and improvements to the nations intelligence 
operations.2  This thesis will focus on an additional area identified by the 9/11 
Commission requiring improvement, aviation security.  Where are we now in terms of 
aviation security?  What security improvements have been completed and is the Aviation 
Transportation System more or less secure from the threat of terrorism?   
The United States Aviation Transportation System is a critical infrastructure.3  As 
such, it must be enveloped with a level of security that will ensure both the safety of 
travelers from the threat of terrorism, and also facilitate the secure mass movement of 
both people and goods.  In 2003 alone, U.S air carriers transported over 595 million 
                                                 
1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report 
(Washington D.C.: 2004), 4. 
2 Ibid., 361-423. 
3 President of the United States, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 
Infrastructures and Key Assets, (Washington D.C.: 2003), 54. 
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passengers aboard commercial aircraft.4  In that same year, over 20,000 persons were 
intercepted at airport screening checkpoints carrying box cutters.5  The importance of 
effective aviation security is crucial in order to protect the public traveler, but it is also a 
necessary deterrent to terrorist threats.   
The threat to aviation security is persistent.  A lack of diligence in aviation 
security will almost certainly welcome the persistent threat of terrorism.  Determining 
where efforts or measures have been implemented may help to focus efforts on areas that 
have not been fortified.  Have the current implementation of post 9/11 security measures 
reduced the vulnerability of commercial aviation to terrorist attack?  What are the 
deficiencies of the system?  Where should future efforts be focused?          
Security efforts in aviation have been under continual scrutiny following 9/11, 
and viewpoints on the effectiveness of those efforts vary considerably.  Opinions range 
from suggesting that the entire security strategy is flawed, to the U.S. has overreacted to 
terrorism, to the stance that current security improvements have had little effect on 
securing commercial aviation.   
Some aviation security experts contend that increased security efforts essentially 
have little or no effect.  The Aviation and Transportation of Security Act of 2001 created 
the Transportation Security Administration, federalized airport screeners, and directed the 
screening of all checked baggage for explosives.6  Some aviation security analysts argue 
that the 100% screening of all checked baggage mandated by Congress actually was a 
detriment to national security due to the fact that the measures diverted funds, attention, 
                                                 
4 U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, U.S. Air Carrier Aircraft Departures, Enplaned Revenue 
Passengers, and Enplaned Revenue Tons, Available from 
http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_01_34.html (accessed 27 
May 2007). 
5 U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Prohibited Items Intercepted at Airport Screening 
Checkpoints, Available from 
http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/2006/html/table_02_16b.html (accessed 
26 May 2007). 
6 United States 107th Congress, Aviation and Transportation Security Act, National Transportation 
Library online Available from http://ntl.bts.gov/faq/avtsa.html (accessed 27 May 2007). 
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and resources from passenger and carry-on baggage screening.7  A similar view is that 
the heavy emphasis on passenger screening leaves other areas vulnerable to attack such 
as airline cargo security.8  While passenger checked luggage is required to be screened 
for explosives, only a small portion of air cargo is ever inspected.9      
The federalization of airport screeners was another post 9/11 measure.  The goal 
was to standardize screening efforts at all airports through centralization of control under 
the Transportation Security Administration.  The Government Accountability Office has 
found that current airport screening efforts are little better than what existed prior to the 
“federalized” effort.10  The report highlights areas of concern such as efforts to hire 
baggage screeners as well as the ability to effectively train the screening workforce.11  
The evidence cited tends to strengthen the argument that post 9/11 provisions have had 
little impact on security efforts.  Chairman of the Subcommittee on Aviation, 
Congressman John Mica stated, "TSA’s current baggage screening system …does not 
even afford us more effective security screening.”12 
Another stronger argument about the current approach to aviation security is that 
it is fundamentally flawed.13  One basic flaw that is pointed out in the current security 
model is that it is premised on an equal-risk model.14  Current procedures presume that 
all air travelers are equally likely to be a threat, and therefore all travelers require equal 
                                                 
7 Grace Jean, “Focus on Checked Bag Screening has Detracted from Aviation Security,” National 
Defense 91, 640 (2007), 30.  
8 Eben Kaplan, “Targets for Terrorists: Post-9/11 Aviation Security,” Council on Foreign Relations 
online article, 7 September 2006, Available from 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11397/targets_for_terrorists.html (accessed 27 May 2007). 
9 David Randall Peterman, Transportation Security: Issues for the 109th Congress (Washington D.C.: 
CRS, 2006), 5. 
10 Ibid. 
11 United States General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal 
Aviation Security Efforts (Washington D.C.: GAO, 2004), 9. 
12Eben Kaplan, “Targets for Terrorists: Post-9/11 Aviation Security,” Council on Foreign Relations 
online article, 7 September 2006, Available from 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11397/targets_for_terrorists.html (accessed 27 May 2007) 
13 Robert W. Poole, Jr., “Airport Security: Time for a New Model,” Reason Foundation online article, 
January 2006, Available from http://www.reason.org/airportssecurity (accessed 21 May 2007), 1. 
14 Ibid., 1-3. 
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attention in terms of screening measures.15  This creates a non-focused security effort 
rather than steering resources to pinpoint persons of risk.  A second criticism is that the 
current efforts are too focused on detecting or restricting dangerous objects as opposed to 
people.16  The contention is that the focus of security is more aligned with preventing 
another 9/11 scenario by keeping dangerous items off of aircraft.  If inflicting mass 
casualties was the sole desire, a terrorist could simply target travelers in a crowded 
airport, therefore the focus of the effort should be aimed at targeting dangerous people, 
not objects.17  While the point is valid, a counter argument is that the last two foiled 
aviation related terrorist incidents, the shoe bomber and the liquid-gel bombing plot, 
highlight the reoccurring theme of attempting to get aboard an aircraft in order to inflict 
damage while airborne.   
Terrorists continue to innovate new methods to bypass or breach aviation security 
in order to utilize commercial aircraft as a means to an end.  Even after increased 
international aviation security efforts following 9/11, terrorist Richard Reid managed to 
board an American Airlines flight in Paris in December 2001 with explosives contained 
in his shoe.18  Security measures in other countries followed the U.S. by focusing efforts 
on passengers’ shoes.  Then in August 2006, British authorities arrested twenty-four 
suspects plotting to simultaneously blow up ten U.S. bound passenger aircraft using yet 
another technique, liquid explosives hidden in their carry-on luggage.19  TSA 
Administrator David Stone told the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation 
                                                 
15 Robert W. Poole, Jr., “Airport Security: Time for a New Model,” Reason Foundation online article, 
January 2006, Available from http://www.reason.org/airportssecurity (accessed 21 May 2007), 1-3. 
16 Ibid., 22. 
17 Ibid., 23. 
18 Kevin A. O’Brien, “France,” in Europe Confronts Terrorism, ed Karen Von Hippel (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 38. 
19 John Ward Anderson and Karen De Young, “Plot to Bomb U.S.-Bound Jets Is Foiled,” Washington 
Post, 11 Aug 2006, Available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/10/AR2006081000152.html (accessed 27 May 2007). 
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Committee in 2005 that “the greatest risk is still that a plane may be  
targeted for attack or used to carry out an attack.20 
One other viewpoint is that the threat of terrorism has been completely blown out 
of proportion.  That perceived risks are usually much greater than actual risks, and 
spectacular risks are more grossly exaggerated than common risks.21  For example, there 
were over 38,000 motor vehicle-related fatalities in the same year as the September 11 
terrorist attacks.22  By sheer body count, vehicle accidents take a far greater toll of life 
than September 11.  A motor vehicle related incident is also far more probable for the 
average U.S. citizen to experience, than being a victim of a terrorist attack.  Yet traffic 
and highway safety is in no way on equal footing to safeguarding the public and critical 
infrastructures from possible acts of terrorism.                    
Given a persistent threat to aviation security and the varied views of security 
measures what is the status of aviation security within the U.S.?  Have security efforts 
reduced the vulnerability of commercial aviation?  Have 9/11 deficiencies been rectified 
and if not what is the causal reason?  Where should security efforts be focused? 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology used will compare security measures before and after 
9/11.  A comparative study of security measures will describe and examine security 
initiatives, the implementation of those initiatives, and security policies.  This study will 
use a United States General Accounting Office Risk Management Model recommended 
for the Transportation Security Administration.23  This model contains three variables, 
                                                 
20 Chris Strohm, “TSA Chief Says aviation attacks still pose greatest risk,” Government 
Executive.com, 15 February 2005, Available from http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0205/021505c1.htm  
(accessed 27 May 2007). 
21 Bruce Schneier, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World (New York: 
Copernicus Books, 2003), 26. 
22 United States Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Motor Vehicle Fatalities, Vehicle-Miles, and 
Associated Rates by Highway Functional System,  Available from 
http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/table_02_18.html  (accessed 27 
May 2007). 
23 United States General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and 
Address Challenges (Washington D.C.: GAO, 2003), 14. 
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the likelihood of the threat, the criticality of the asset, and the vulnerability of the system.  
The first two variables will remain constant as the likelihood of the threat to commercial 
aviation is historically proven, and the criticality of the asset in this study has only one 
facet, the commercial airliner.  The third variable then is what will be focused on, the 
vulnerability of the system.  The security measures will be categorized into one of three 
functional layers, access, physical security or direct action.  Within each layer, the 
number of protective measures will then be examined against pre 9/11 measures to draw 
conclusions as to the improvement in vulnerability reduction.   
The 9/11 commission deficiencies will also be compared to the current security 
initiatives in an effort to determine if the deficiencies have been rectified.  If deficiencies 
have not been countered, possible causal aspects such as funding constraints, training or 
oversight problems will be discussed to recommend areas for further focus.  
D. AVIATION PIRACY EVOLUTION 
Aviation Piracy is not a new phenomenon.  Aviation hijackings occurred as early 
1931 when Peruvian Revolutionaries hijacked a Pan American Ford Trimotor mail plane 
in order to distribute propaganda leaflets.24  As the aviation age progressed, so too did 
aviation related crimes.  Why?  Terrorists exploit new technologies as a means to achieve 
their goals.  David Rapoport chronicles four waves of modern terrorist groups from the 
1800s to the late 1970s, and associated with the swell of each new wave of terrorists, was 
a new transportation or communication technology that was susceptible to terrorist 
exploitation.25  In this case, aviation hijacking or the exploitation of commercial aviation 
became the new modus operandi of the international terrorist.  The rash of terrorist 
hijackings that occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s coincided with the dawn of 
commercial jet aviation.  The modern era of trans continental travel was growing, and 
with it so grew the exploitation of modern commercial jetliners.   
                                                 
24 Peter St. John, Air Piracy, Airport Security, and International Terrorism (New York: Quorum 
Books, 1991), 5. 
25 David Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of A 
grand Strategy, ed. Audrey Kurth Kronin and James Ludes, (Washington DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 2004), 47.  
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1. Hijackings 
The first aircraft hijacked within the United States occurred in 1961.26  Antuilo 
Ramirez Ortiz forced a National Airlines Convair flight crew at gunpoint to fly the 
aircraft to Communist Cuba.27  This marked the starting point of a rash of aviation 
hijacking events in the United States, which gained a significant swell in the latter part of 
the decade.  Between 1968 and 1972, 326 aircraft hijack attempts occurred throughout 
the world.28  Of those 326 hijackings, 124 occurred within the United States.29  In 1968 
alone there were twenty aircraft hijackings in the U.S.30  Initially, the rationale for 
hijacking an aircraft was for transportation, but the rationale soon expanded.  Robert 
Holden’s article, “The Contagiousness of Aircraft Hijacking,” placed aircraft hijackings 
into one of two main categories depending on the demand or desired objective of the 
hijacker, either hijacking for extortion or hijacking for transportation.31  
a.   Transportation   
As aircraft hijacking incidents grew in number, the objective of hijackers 
tended to focus more on securing transportation to a desired destination.  In the 1960s, 
the majority of aviation hijack incidents in the United States were the result of aircraft 
being diverted to Cuba.  Out of 111 aircraft hijackings whose hijackers solely sought a 
means of transportation from the United States, ninety of those were destined for Cuba.32  
In 1968 alone there were nineteen U.S. domestic flights that were hijacked to Cuba, and 
in 1969, this trend spiked to thirty-nine hijackings within the U.S. and all but two were 
                                                 
26 United States Department of State, Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology, 
Available from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm (accessed 2 Aug 2007). 
27 Jin-Tai Choi, Aviation Terrorism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 23. 
28 Judy Rumerman, “Aviation Security,” U.S. Centennial Commission of Flight, Available from 
http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Government_Role/security/POL18.htm (accessed 3 Aug 2007). 
29 William M. Landes, “An Economic Study of U.S. Aircraft Hijacking, 1961-1976,” Journal of Law 
and Economics Vol. 21, No. 1 (1978): 1. 
30 Laura Dugan et al., “Testing A Rational Choice Model of Airline Hijackings,” Criminology 43 no. 4 
(2005): 1041. 




seeking destination Cuba as an objective.33  Many of these incident hijackers were of 
Cuban birth and only desired to return to their homeland, as travel to Cuba from the U.S.  
was banned.34  Some hijackings however, were not only characterized by a desire to 
utilize commercial aviation as a source of transportation, but also held additional hijacker 
demands.      
b.  Extortion   
Initially, hijackers desiring a means of transportation dominated aircraft 
hijackings, but as the act of air piracy grew, so to did the reasons for hijacking aircraft.  
Hijackers requested additional demands and extortion became a common reason in 
addition to modern conveyance.  Extortion objectives ranged from political objectives to 
prisoner release to media attention.35  In the U.S. however, monetary gain was the 
primary reason for extortion related hijacking attempts.36   
The first extortion related hijacking in the U.S. occurred in 1970 at Dulles 
Airport, Virginia when an aircraft was held for ransom by a hijacker demanding $100 
million dollars.37  Another similar U.S. hijacking occurred the following year when a 
hijacker demanded a monetary ransom and then forced the crew to fly the aircraft to the 
Bahamas.38  The extortion element was not isolated to the U.S., as extortion hijackings 
were occurring worldwide as well.  Five more extortion related hijackings occurred 
within the U.S. in 1971, one of which hijackers demanded the release of several Black 
Panther members from prison.39  The most notable extortion related hijacking of 1971 
                                                 
33 Robert T. Holden, “The Contagiousness of Aircraft Hijacking,” The American Journal of Sociology 
(1986): 881-882. 
34 Ibid., 877. 
35 Alona E. Evans, “Aircraft Hijacking: What Is Being Done,” The American Journal of International 
Law Vol. 67, No.4 (1973): 644. 
36 Robert T. Holden, “The Contagiousness of Aircraft Hijacking,” The American Journal of Sociology 
(1986): 879. 
37 Alona E. Evans, “Aircraft Hijacking: What Is Being Done,” The American Journal of International 
Law Vol. 67, No. 4 (1973): 646. 
38 Robert T. Holden, “The Contagiousness of Aircraft Hijacking,” The American Journal of Sociology 
(1986): 885. 
39 Ibid., 882-885. 
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was unquestionably the DB Cooper heist in which he demanded a ransom of $200,000 
dollars and two parachutes.40  He subsequently jumped from the rear door of the Boeing 
727 while it was in-flight and was never caught nor the money recovered.     
The following year, 1972, there were thirty-one hijackings within the U.S., 
and of those thirty-one, nineteen were extortion related, but hijacking rates began to 
decline.41  In 1973 only two aircraft hijacking occurred the U.S.42  Between 1973 and 
1982, the average number of U.S. hijackings per year was only 9.3 as compared to 
twenty-nine per year between 1968-1972.43  The high rate of hijackings in the United 
States did not rise again until the 1980s.44 
2. Implications for Security 
In the earliest days of aviation, hijacking was a minor concern.  It was not an 
element of focus even though the act of hijacking an aircraft became more prevalent.  
U.S. hijacking incidents in the late 1960s became commonplace for passengers and flight 
crews.  In 1969 at least one hijacking occurred each month.45  Aircrews began to carry 
approach information for airports in Cuba, and aircrew training emphasized compliance 
with hijackers as diplomatic procedures were in place for the return of aircraft and 
passengers.46  Compliance and non-resistance were the focal points to eventually gain the 
release of passengers and crew.  Hijackers would issue their demands, be delivered to 
their destination and eventually, passengers and aircraft would be returned to the U.S.    
From the U.S. perspective, this is how hijackings occurred.  It wasn’t until 1971 that the 
                                                 
40 Jin-Tai Choi, Aviation Terrorism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 20. 
41 Robert T. Holden, “The Contagiousness of Aircraft Hijacking,” The American Journal of Sociology 
(1986): 885. 
42 Laura Dugan et al., “Testing A Rational Choice Model of Airline Hijackings,” Criminology 43 no. 4 
(2005): 1041. 
43 Robert T. Holden, “The Contagiousness of Aircraft Hijacking,” The American Journal of Sociology 
(1986): 885. 
44 Laura Dugan et al., “Testing A Rational Choice Model of Airline Hijackings,” Criminology Vol. 43 
No. 4 (2005): 1041. 
45 Robert T. Holden, “The Contagiousness of Aircraft Hijacking,” The American Journal of Sociology 
(1986): 882. 
46 Ibid., 881. 
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first passenger was killed in the U.S. during an aircraft hijack.47  Hijackings became more 
violent, as the killing of passengers and aircrews or the bombing of aircraft incidents 
escalated.  In September 1970, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 
simultaneously hijacked and later destroyed four commercial airliners, two of which were 
U.S. aircraft.48  This event was essentially the culmination or turning point of aviation 
hijackings for the era.  It struck an international chord and drove the need to establish an 
international legal stance to counter the problem of hijacking.   
As a result of the rising rate of airline hijackings, the Hague Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft was held in 1970.  Sixty cooperating states 
agreed on provisions to enact legislation against hijacking, arrest and trial provisions, and 
active response measures such as blocking the runway or disabling the aircraft while on 
the ground to prevent it from taking off.49  The Hague Convention also framed the 
difficult subject of jurisdiction.  Hijacking had become not only an international problem 
but it created a gray area of jurisdictional boundary that hijackers traveling from country 
to country could exploit.  Where did each country’s authority begin and end?   The Hague 
Convention sought to narrow that jurisdictional gap.50  The Hague convention facilitated 
the groundwork to apprehend hijack perpetrators, as it was more punitive in nature than 
the Tokyo Convention of 1963, which tended to focus more on the return of aircraft.51  
Domestically, from 1961 through 1976, as the apprehension rates of domestic hijackers 
grew, the number of domestic hijacking incidents subsequently declined.52  Prison 
sentences also increased in duration, which had a corollary impact.  The average sentence 
                                                 
47 Peter St. John, Air Piracy, Airport Security, and International Terrorism (New York: Quorum 
Books, 1991), 14. 
48 Alona E. Evans, “Aircraft Hijacking: What Is Being Done,” The American Journal of International 
Law Vol. 67, No.4 (1973): 652. 
49 Sami Shubber, “Aircraft Hijacking under the Hague Convention 1970: A New Regime?” The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 22, No. 4. (1973): 708. 
50 Ibid., 718. 
51 Alona E. Evans, “Aircraft Hijacking: What Is Being Done,” The American Journal of International 
Law Vol. 67, No.4 (1973): 667. 
52 William M. Landes, “An Economic Study of U.S. Aircraft Hijacking, 1961-1976,” Journal of Law 
and Economics Vol. 21, No. 1 (1978): 2. 
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for those convicted of hijacking between 1972 and 1974 was thirty years.53  The treaty 
between the U.S. and Cuba to curb the Cuba-hijack-movement also had a significant 
impact.  Both countries signed a treaty in 1973 agreeing to either extradite or punish 
hijackers.54  This treaty essentially alleviated the safe haven for asylum seekers 
regardless of which direction they were traveling, either to or from Cuba. 
The security policies governing airport and airline security procedures also 
became more stringent.  The Federal Aviation Administration provided the airlines the 
authority to deny travel to persons that would not consent to a search of their persons or 
luggage.55  Warning signs were also posted in airports as reminders that it was a federal 
offense to carry concealed weapons or to hijack an aircraft.56  In the face of ever 
increasing violent hijack events coupled with the aforementioned PFLP hijacking, on 
September 11, 1970, President Nixon introduced an anti-hijacking program that included 
expanding the Federal Sky Marshal program started in 1961.57  These initial efforts were 
noteworthy, but in 1972 two U.S. aircraft were hijacked within days of each other 
resulting in the death of one airline employee, and another five persons injured.  This 
incident spawned the 100% screening of boarding passengers policy, a mandatory 
inspection of carry-on luggage in January 1973, and the placement of armed guards at all 
airport boarding gates.58  These security efforts were not limited only to policy as then 
current advanced technologies and science were also employed to enhance security 
operations such as the procurement of electronic security detection devices.  In 1972, 
$3.5 million dollars was allotted to procure detection devices, resulting in the installation 
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of metal detectors in airports by 1973.59  The use of behavioral science was also 
employed to develop behavioral profiling training for airport personnel in order to 
identify potential hijackers.60   
Following 1972, there was a rapid decline in the number of hijackings in the U.S., 
and there were zero hijackings in the first eight months of 1973.61  An increasing number 
of anti-hijack related laws, security policies and applied security technologies were put 
into place that had a significant impact on the declining hijacking rate.  These security 
measures had positive results.  But it was an applied combination of international 
response, implemented legal tools with harsh penalty, improved security policy coupled 
with advanced technologies that successfully curbed the hijacking dilemma of the late 
1960s and early 1970s.62  There were still sporadic accounts of aircraft hijackings, but for 
a period of eight years following 1992, there were no hijack events within the United 
States.63  Prior to 9/11, there was a significant lull in domestic hijack activity.      
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II. FRAMING THE AVIATION SECURITY PROBLEM 
A. THE AVIATION TRANSPORTION SYSTEM 
This primary focus of this thesis is one aspect of securing the Aviation 
Transportation System, the security measures applied to commercial aviation.  In order to 
frame the security problem properly, however, a brief description of the Aviation 
Transportation System is necessary in order to illustrate the difficulty of providing 
foolproof security to a public mode of transportation.  The sheer size of the Aviation 
Transportation System makes this an almost insurmountable task.   
The Aviation Transportation System is comprised of aircraft, operators, airports, 
facilities and infrastructure, as well as services and airspace.64  It is a multi-faceted 
system that includes both private and public involvement as well as seven federal 
government agencies.  Both commercial and general aviation operations are conducted 
from over 19,800 airports throughout the U.S.65  The Transportation Security 
Administration estimates that there are a million airport employees including vendor 
workers employed at commercial airports throughout the country.66  These numbers do 
not even include personnel located at remote FAA radar facilities or Flight Service 
Stations.   
The complexity of these intertwined aviation elements is compounded by the 
numerous government agencies that are also woven within the fabric of the Aviation 
Transportation System.  These agencies work to secure, maintain, and regulate the 
operations and infrastructure of the system.  The Department of Transportation for 
instance manages the system infrastructure such as airport facilities.  The Transportation 
Security Administration is the lead agency for security, and the Federal Aviation 
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Administration regulates operations, coordinates the nations massive volume of airspace, 
and controls the daily congestion of air traffic over flying our nation, the majority of 
which is general aviation.   
Although general aviation has not been a primary target of terrorists, it never the 
less makes up a large portion of domestic aviation.  Three quarters of all aircraft that 
take-off and land in the U.S. are general aviation aircraft.67  In terms of persons and 
aircraft, general aviation operations involve over 550,000 pilots and 200,000 private 
aircraft.68  While these numbers are significant, commercial aviation is by far the leading 
entity when viewed in terms movement volume, either of people or goods.  
1. Commercial Aviation 
Commercial aviation operations include both passenger airlines as well as 
commercial cargo carriers.  In February 2006, 153 commercial air carriers, including 
commuter airlines were certified to conduct operations in the United States.69  In that 
same year, certified air carriers employed 589,961 people at locations and airports 
throughout the aviation system.70  And in 2005, 554 domestic airports were operating as 
commercial service airports.71  The large number of commercial passenger carriers has 
provided terrorists with a variety of targets, and as passenger volume increases, so does 
an exploitation source for terrorists.      
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a. Passenger 
Passenger airlines have been the principal target for terrorists in the 
aviation community.  The volume and throughput of commercial passenger aviation 
exacerbates the aviation security problem.  In 2006, there were 131 commercial 
passenger carriers that operated in or from the United States.72  In 2005, U.S. passenger 
carriers ferried 701,509,325 travelers, and that number does not even include commuter 
airline enplanements.73  The year prior, 672,018,635 passengers traveled on board 
commercial airliners.74  These carriers transport millions of travelers each year, to and 
from hundreds of major airports, and handle more than 2.5 billion handheld and checked 
luggage.75  In just one month in 2005, passenger commercial airlines flew 822,374 
domestic flights.76  Many of these commercial passenger carriers also simultaneously 
transport cargo within the lower bay of the aircraft, and cargo security presents yet 
another challenge to the aviation security arena. 
b. Cargo 
There are twenty-five air carriers within the U.S. that dedicate commercial 
flights solely to cargo.77  Within the freight industry, airfreight ships the least amount of 
cargo annually in comparison to other industry modes of transportation such as rail or 
truck.  However, the sheer tonnage freighted by air is still very large.  In 2004, over one 
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billion tons of commercial air cargo was airlifted either by dedicated cargo or passenger-
cargo commercial flights.78  The commercial air cargo arena is also filled with additional 
actors.  The “passenger” must be shipped which in turn invites additional entities to the 
aviation security arena.  The movement of airfreight will involve the initial shipper, 
freight forwarders, logistic integrators, and airport logistic centers.79  All of these groups 
will widen the security aperture and present additional security problems.  
B. PRE-9/11 AVIATION SECURITY MEASURES 
1. Building the Security Layers 
The first wave of aviation hijackings was challenged by the development and 
implementation of passenger screening devices and regulated security processes.  These 
initial security and screening efforts laid the foundation for security programs to follow, 
many of which in principal are still in use.    
a. The 1980s and Pan Am Flight 103 
In the 1980s, in the face of increased international hijacking events, 
President Reagan signed the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 
1985, which once again authorized funding to revive the Federal Air Marshal program.80  
Similar to the Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974, the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1985 
allowed the secretary of transportation to levy even harsher penalties on foreign air 
carriers operating in the U.S. that failed to meet security standards.81  Funding was also 
appropriated to further develop security and explosive detection technologies.82  These 
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technologies would soon become even more of a high interest item as emphasis shifted 
from guns and knives and moved towards finding explosives. 
The shock value achieved by terrorists targeting commercial aviation was 
reinforced again in 1988 with the death of 270 persons flying on board a Pan Am 747 
airliner.  Aviation security was once again tested and penetrated by a bomb made of 
plastic explosive that was placed on board Pan American Flight 103, inside a piece of 
checked baggage.  A timer detonated the bomb that exploded the aircraft in mid-air over 
Lockerbie, Scotland.  The owner of the luggage was not on board.  Although this flight 
did not depart from a U.S. airport, concern grew within the U.S. regarding domestic 
aviation security and the ability to screen and detect explosives.  This concern would 
generate a presidential commission.  
The Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism convened in 1989 
following Pan Am Flight 103 incident.  The commission’s charge was to evaluate then 
current aviation security policies and practices, and recommend improvements.  In 
general, the commission found that the aviation security system “was sorely lacking.”83 It 
noted shortcomings in intelligence information, specifically in gaining, accessing and 
disseminating intelligence, and also a lack of federal government oversight of airline and 
airport activities.84  The commission cited 64 recommendations to improve domestic 
aviation security, one of which was to establish minimum standards for hiring, training, 
and employing security personnel.85  The commission also recommended placing Federal 
security managers at high risk airports to ensure airlines comply with security 
mandates.86   
Following the Pan Am incident, the secretary of transportation directed the 
installation of new Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) explosive detection machines at 
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100 of the main commercial airports in the U.S.87  Only three machines were deployed 
for initial operational testing however, and their performance was evaluated as 
unsatisfactory.88  Due to these initial results, the aforementioned commission also 
recommended accelerating research to develop new explosive detection technologies.89     
As a result of the commission’s findings, President George H.W. Bush 
signed the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, which codified the commission’s 
recommendations.90  The act implemented security enhancements in three main areas, 
oversight, screener standards and explosive detection technology.91   New positions were 
created within FAA to provide security oversight.  The Act also required FAA to 
announce rules requiring airlines to apply standards for the hiring, continued 
employment, and training of security workers, to include criminal background checks.92 
The act also mandated FAA to accelerate research on explosive detection technology, and 
to deploy new explosive detection equipment by November 1993.93   
It is important to note however, that several accounts indicate that the 
Aviation Security Improvement Act did little to improve aviation security.  The intent to 
improve security was worthwhile, yet by the time another 747 accidentally exploded in 
mid-air in 1996 due to mechanical failure, airport security had not improved, explosive 
detection machines were not deployed to airports, airport screeners were still poorly 
trained, and suitcases were not matched to passengers on domestic flights.94   
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Almost simultaneous to the Commission on Aviation Security and 
Terrorism’s hearings, the U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) completed its 
report on FAA’s domestic and international security programs.  GAO testimony before 
Congress noted that fundamental deficiencies existed in four areas of FAA's aviation 
security program: passenger screening, airport security controls, security inspections, and 
training requirements for security personnel.95  The report cited that high turnover rates, 
low wages, and inadequate training hindered security screening effectiveness.96  In terms 
of airport security, the report cited a lack of employee identification controls, and access 
to aircraft operation areas, or restricted areas was fairly open.97  The report also noted 
that FAA airport security inspections were inadequately accomplished, and standards 
among different airline security training programs were lacking.98 
A subsequent 1994 GAO report regarding the development of security 
technology referencing the Aviation Security and Improvement Act of 1990, reported that 
little progress had been made on deploying new explosive detection systems.99  At the 
time of the report, six years had passed since the Pan Am 103 incident, and FAA was still 
assessing forty different detection technologies but none of them had fully met FAA's 
performance requirements to detect sophisticated plastic explosives.100  As a result of 
these shortfalls, there still was no explosive detection capability for checked baggage.        
b. The 1990s and TWA Flight 800   
The next major aviation security review was by the White House 
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, chaired by then Vice President Al Gore.   
This commission was created less than one month after the mid-air explosion of another 
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U.S. 747 airliner.  On July 17, 1996, TWA Flight 800 laden with 230 passengers and 
crew, exploded shortly after take off from New York’s John F. Kennedy airport.101  
While investigators determined that the cause of the mid-air explosion of TWA Flight 
800 was the eruption of the center fuel tank and not the result of a terrorist bomb, the 
accident itself looked too similar to Lockerbie.  Incident eyewitnesses recounted seeing a 
streak of light heading towards the airliner from the ground, which many speculated was 
a man portable air defense missile, igniting the possibility of another terrorist attack.  As 
a result of the TWA incident, President Clinton established the commission to study 
aviation security and safety issues, and to establish a plan to implement new explosive 
detection technology.102   
The Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, which was also known 
as the Gore Commission, released its final report in 1997, which contained 31 
recommendations to improve aviation security.  Many of the recommendations were 
similar to those of the previous Aviation Security and Terrorism Commission in 1989 and 
tended to fall in one of three main areas: security and screening personnel, explosive 
detection technology, and the use of technology to facilitate passenger profiling, and 
passenger to bag-matching measures.   
The airlines were responsible for screening passengers and their baggage, 
and for training the personnel that performed those duties.  But training and standards 
varied from carrier to carrier.  One notable Commission recommendation was to establish 
federally mandated standards for screener training, hiring, and operator performance 
standards.103  The federal mandate would also apply to the operation of explosive 
detection systems, automated bag match technology, and profiling programs.104  This 
mandate would apply set operating standards to all aspects of security screening in order 
to ensure continuity of operations among differing airlines and different security 
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companies.  In order to increase the professionalism of the screener workforce, the 
Commission also recommended a national program to certify the screening companies.105  
Screening companies would be required to meet the established standards mandated for 
screener personnel, and company hiring evaluations would be based on screening 
performance, not the lowest contract cost bid.  To further cultivate the profession, human 
factors were addressed such as implementing reward-performance programs and 
exploring the use of best practice initiatives.106  The quality of the security workforce 
was previously addressed by the 1989 Commission which had also cited a need for 
training and hiring standards.  The Gore Commission also recommended criminal 
background and FBI fingerprint checks for all security screeners and airport and airline 
employees with access to secure areas.107     
Acquiring an explosive detection capability was still a high priority in the 
aviation security arena.  To enable the FAA to satisfy the delinquent federal deadline of 
deploying an explosive detection technology, the Commission recommended deploying 
current existing available commercial technology.108  To this point, only one explosive 
detection device had met FAA’s operational requirements, but its performance was 
sluggish, and it was expensive.  The Commission felt that by deploying current 
technology in use at international airports, while not meeting FAA’s certification 
standards, it would provide some added measure of protection to aviation travelers.109  In 
order to augment the detection technology, due to its protracted development, the 
Commission also recommended expanding the use and deployment of bomb-sniffing 
dogs.110  
The third major area of the Commission’s recommendations surrounded 
the use of technology to automate passenger profiling and to implement a 100% bag-
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passenger match measure by December 31, 1997.111  The checked bags of passengers 
selected either by an automated profiling program or at random, would then either be 
screened or matched to a boarded passenger.112  These combined measures would first 
identify passengers of “risk,” and second ensure that their bags were screened for 
explosives or that the passenger was on board the aircraft prior to the bag being loaded.  
This measure would counter the Lockerbie scenario of a checked bag with no owner-
passenger on board, yet the scenario of a suicide bomber on an aircraft had not presented 
itself.  One additional measure recommended by the Commission was to “aggressively 
test existing security systems” by increasing the use of "Red Teams" or adversary 
agents.113  The Commission recommended incorporating red teaming as a standard 
element of airport security measures to continually re-assess airport security by finding 
vulnerabilities.   
The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 was passed following 
the initial recommendations of the Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.  The 
measures enacted that applied to the security workforce directed FAA to certify security 
screening companies, to develop uniform security screening performance standards, and 
to require employment background checks on screeners and security personnel associated 
with baggage or cargo functions.114  In the arena of explosive detection, FAA was 
directed to assess, and deploy, explosive detection technologies that were currently 
available to commercial aviation.115  Passenger profiling was also addressed but only to 
the extent that FAA and other agencies “should continue to assist air carriers in their 
development of passenger profiling programs.”116  The same held true in reference to a 
passenger bag-match program.  Finally, the Act also directed periodic vulnerability 
assessments of airport security systems. 
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The Commission on Aviation Safety and Security’s recommendations did 
meet with some success.  In 1996, the FAA awarded six contracts to explosive detection 
technology manufacturers and ordered 54 explosive detection systems.117  The FAA also 
received funding for 114 additional canine teams to augment technology based explosive 
detection measures, and FAA hired 300 new special agents to red team airport 
security.118  Progress on an automated passenger profiling system had also been made.    
Northwest Airlines had been utilizing a passenger pre-screening program since 1996.119  
Through coordination between Northwest Airlines and the FAA, the implementation of 
the Computer Assisted Passenger Screening (CAPS) program began in 1998.120   
Following the Presidential Commission’s initial report however, GAO 
testimony in September 1996 on aviation security concluded that the aviation system still 
had significant flaws.  The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 directed FAA 
to certify screening contractors, but by 2001, certification still was not complete.121  The 
GAO testimony cited that, “Nearly every major aspect of the system, ranging from the 
screening of passengers, checked and carry-on baggage, mail, and cargo as well as access 
to secured areas within airports and aircraft, has weaknesses that terrorists could 
exploit.”122  Progress had been made at least in terms of security legislation, but the 
implementation of the security recommendations fell short of the intended operational 
application.  Increased security measures meant increased security costs to the airlines.  
The lack of full implementation of many of the directed security initiatives left the 
security layers vulnerable.       
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2. Holes in the Layers – The Deficiencies 
The aviation security system on September 11, 2001 was based on a layered 
system of security measures.  The system was comprised of seven defensive layers 
composed of intelligence, passenger prescreening, airport access control, passenger 
checkpoint screening, passenger checked baggage screening, cargo screening, and on-
board security.123  The layered security concept can present a valid defense, but many of 
the layers on September 11 were porous, which once again placed aviation security 
concerns at the forefront of public and government concern.  Even after two presidential 
commissions and two major legislative acts directed at improving aviation security, a 
GAO testimony at a Senate oversight hearing on Aviation Security in April 2000 cited 
that major vulnerabilities in the aviation security system still existed.124   
The first layer was intelligence and in the scope of this study, intelligence pertains 
to aviation no-fly lists.  In 2001, The FAA’s no-fly list contained the names of persons 
that airlines were directed to deny commercial flight.  However, in 2001, the FAA’s 
passenger list contained less than 20 names.125  By contrast, the State Department’s 
watch list contained thousands of names of high interest persons.126  The sharing of 
intelligence data, in this case terrorist lists with private companies or foreign air carrier 
governments was the concern and impediment.127 
Passenger prescreening efforts in place in 2001 consisted of the Computer- 
Assisted Aviation Pre-Screening System (CAPS) program, developed in 1996.128  CAPS 
would determine which passengers would undergo additional security scrutiny based on 
classified criteria.  Under the FAA’s rules however, if CAPS designated a traveler, air 
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carriers were only required to screen the selectee’s checked luggage for explosives or 
ensure the luggage was on the aircraft after the selectee boarded.129  This logic was 
understandable in the wake of the Lockerbie incident.  However, on 9/11, CAPS screened 
all nineteen hijackers, and only seven were designated as selectee’s.130  As a result, three 
of the selectee’s had their bags screened for explosives and one had his bag held until he 
was confirmed on board the aircraft.131  The other three hijackers did not check any 
luggage, which made their CAPS selection irrelevant.132 
Airport access control posed an additional layer of security, although enforcement 
and compliance problems were significant.  Access control is looked at in two respects, 
the background of the employees, and controlling access to secure areas.  The 
background of security employees is significant as the objective is to sanitize the 
workforce from those with questionable backgrounds that may potentially compromise 
aviation security operations.  The background checks that were mandated however, were 
based only on work history.  FBI criminal checks were only required when there was a 
gap of 12 months or more in past employment history.133  One review of six airports 
found that in 35% of the employee files reviewed, complete background checks were not 
accomplished and yet these employees were granted secure area access.134  One 
contentious issue was the list of crimes that eliminated an employee from eligibility for 
secure area access.  The list itself only contained 25 crimes, and did not include crimes 
such as assault with a deadly weapon, larceny, or drug possession.135   
Access control was also weakened by the lack of enforcement of restricted area 
access.  In 1999, the U.S. Department of Transportation Inspector General released the 
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Airport Access Control Report.  The report stipulated that at eight major airports, IG 
personnel were able to penetrate secure areas 117 times out of 173 attempts.136  Agents 
were then able to board aircraft operated by 35 different carriers 117 times.137  It is 
interesting to note that in 43 of the aircraft boardings, aviation employees ranging from 
flight crews to food service workers were also onboard but did not challenge the 
trespassers.138 
Passenger checkpoint screening was the next layer of defense.  Checkpoint 
screening involved a physical metal detector pass through stemming from aviation 
security measures of the 1970’s and the X-ray screening of carry-on luggage for 
dangerous items such as guns or knives.  These measures combined with the screener 
workforce made up the checkpoint screening system.  This particular layer had continued 
to be plagued with sub par performance stemming from a lack of standards, training 
deficiencies and high turnover rates.  A 1989 GAO report cited that the in-place 
passenger screening process could not ensure that firearms or explosives were prevented 
from being carried on board passenger aircraft.139  Passenger screening was repeatedly 
addressed in testimony and aviation security commissions as an area of concern, 
primarily in training deficiencies, a lack of screening standards, and the quality and 
experience level of the screener.   
Screener training was perhaps one of the most critisized areas of the passenger 
screening checkpoint.  Since airlines were required to provide passenger security and 
usually sub-contracted that responsibility, there was no set standard in screener 
performance or training subject matter.140  In addition, screeners were only required to 
have eight hours of training compared with the international average of forty hours.141  
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The 1996 Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act had directed FAA to certify security 
screening companies and to develop uniform security screening performance standards.  
However, GAO testimony in 2000 before the senate subcommittee on aviation, noted that 
neither of these initiatives was complete and that screener certification would not begin 
until 2002.142  One additional note on standards or lack there of, was the FAA mandate to 
screen passengers for “dangerous items.”  Aside from guns, large knives, explosives or 
incendiary devices however, the FAA advised carriers to apply common sense as to what 
constituted a dangerous weapon.143  The screening mandates themselves were ambiguous. 
The screeners were also under watchful scrutiny.  At many of the large airports, 
security screener turnover rates exceeded 100 percent per year.144  In one year, one 
airport trained 1,000 screeners, and at the end of that year, only 140 remained.145  The 
high turn over rate contributed to low screener experience levels and it impacted the 
supervisory capability of the security workforce.  One of the primary reasons cited for the 
high turn over rate was the low hourly wage, which in 2000 averaged at $5.75 hour.146  A 
low hourly wage combined with only a few hours of required training for a security 
screener softened the defensive layer of passenger checkpoint screening.  Legislators 
continued to call on the need for technology to augment many security functions, yet the 
lynchpin in the equation was the lack of experience of the human operator.  The lack of 
required training was the single most glaring deficiency in the U.S. civil aviation security 
system.147   
Passenger checked baggage screening was an additional security layer.  It relied 
on CAPPS, a Positive Passenger Bag Matching program, and the deployment of an 
explosive detection technology.  By February 2000,  CAPPS and a Positive Passenger 
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Bag Matching program had been adopted by all major U.S. carriers.148   In addition, 111 
Explosive Detection Systems and 552 Trace explosive detection devices had been 
deployed.149  However, airlines were not required to screen any more bags than the 
number of bags checked by selectees, and the Department of Transportation Inspector 
General’s office testified that the explosive detection systems were underused.150  Over 
half of the explosive detection systems deployed were screening only 225 bags per day 
compared to the machines throughput capacity of 225 bags per hour.151  Another audit in 
1999 revealed that screening personnel were not competent at operating the explosive 
detection equipment.152  Operators repeatedly failed detection tests because the operator 
would clear bags without searching them even though the machine had provided a 
warning.153  These performance failures unfortunately would point back to the ability of 
the operator and not necessarily the capability of the machine. 
Another aviation security layer was cargo screening, specifically for cargos 
intended for transport in passenger aircraft.  As previously mentioned, commercial 
passenger aircraft routinely carry cargo in the aircraft belly along with passenger 
baggage.  The 1996 Commission on Aviation Safety and Security had recommended that 
efforts should begin to address threats that could penetrate the aviation arena through the 
cargo venue.  The Commission recommended implementing known and unknown 
shipper profiles, shipper and forwarder employee screening procedures, and mandating 
the immediate examination of all cargo or move cargo onto only all-cargo carrier 
platforms.154  The Commission also recommended the use of explosive detection systems 
to examine passenger airline cargo, and the development of a computer assisted cargo 
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profiling system similar to the passenger screening system.155  By 2000 FAA had 
implemented a known shipper program requiring cargo carriers and freight forwarders to 
establish security procedures for cargo from known and unknown shippers.156  However, 
explosive detection systems were not developed, nor was legislation enacted to mandate 
it.157   
The final defensive layer, comprised primarily of on-board security, was fairly 
limited.  The Federal Air Marshal program was still active in 2001, but agent numbers 
had dwindled down to only 33 prior to September 11.158  The Federal Air Marshals had 
also been directed to fly almost exclusively on international flights, not domestic.159  
Flight crews were trained to the “common strategy,” cooperate with hijackers to 
eventually get the aircraft on the ground safely.”160  This latter notion no doubt was a 
protocol based on hijackings of earlier eras in which cooperation would eventually garner 
the release of passengers and crew.   
A Department of Defense agency, Northern American Aerospace Defense 
Command (NORAD), which was operationally active, represented a last-chance measure 
in the final security layer.  While NORAD was charged with the defense of the U.S. 
against airborne threats, its focus was on threats coming from outside U.S. borders.161  
The 9/11 Commission found NORAD unprepared to deal with a threat from within.162  
NORAD’s alert fighter bases had dwindled in number to only seven with two aircraft on 
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alert at each base.163  And while NORAD’s training scenarios did occasionally address 
hijacked aircraft, the scenarios were focused on aircraft coming from overseas.352 
The layers were in place, however, for the most part, each layer was hampered to 
some degree.  One additional weakness that was noted in many reports was the lack of 
security foresight or of a strategic aviation security plan.  This resulted in a reactive- 
security measure-implementation cycle.  The weaknesses of the security system were 
highlighted after each major disaster and reactive measures were put in place to fix or 
rectify the fault.  These fixes however, were not always carried through, or required 
extensive time to achieve completion.  The 9/11 Commission noted that efforts to pass 
checkpoint screener performance regulations, implement anti-sabotage measures, and 
aviation security assessments were ongoing, but there were no increases in security 
measures in response to heightened threat levels in the spring and summer of 2001.164   
Many security initiatives had been proposed over the course of the aviation-hijack 
historic timeline, and some were implemented.  Leading up to 9/11, however, forty-two 
government reports had highlighted flaws or weaknesses in domestic aviation security.165  
The security layers were not impregnable and flaws in the security system still existed.  
As aviation hijackings faded from news headlines and the forefront of domestic concern, 
so to did the perceived threat to aviation.  It would instead take another hi-jacking event 
of magnanimous proportions on September 11, 2001 to once again re-invoke the cycle of 
aviation security change. 
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III. AVIATION SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS 
The events on September 11, 2001 once again brought aviation security to the 
center stage.  The apparent cyclic nature of aviation security enhancements would begin 
again in the aftermath of one of the largest aviation related disasters in U.S.  But the 
magnitude of the U.S.’s reaction would be significantly larger for many reasons.  First, 
the September 11 hijackings were a terrorist incident that occurred within the continental 
U.S., not overseas.  Second it involved multiple commercial airliners not just a single 
aircraft.  Third it was a successful attack, 75% of the weapons used struck their targets.  
A fourth reason was the sheer magnitude of the attack, which killed 2,973 persons.166  
Finally, a contributing factor was the media coverage of the incident itself.  The graphic 
nature captured on film of the second airliner impacting the World Trade Center, persons 
jumping to their death, and the collapse of both towers left an indelible impression.  
These reasons would fuel the entire nation to enact and support a wide spectrum of 
counterterrorist measures.  Given the method of attack chosen by 9/11 terrorists, a logical 
choice was to focus efforts once again on aviation security. 
Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, all aviation within the United States was 
grounded.  Most of the nation’s airports re-opened two days later, but there were 
noticeable changes in security measures.  Curbside and offsite check-in was no longer 
available as passengers could only check in at airline ticket counters.167  Only ticketed 
passengers could now proceed past the security checkpoints, and aircraft would be 
thoroughly searched prior to passenger boarding.168  Vehicles could not be parked closer 
than 300 feet to passenger terminals, and passengers were no longer allowed to carry 
                                                 
166 CNN, “U.S. deaths in Iraq, war on terror surpass 9/11 toll,” CNN Online, Available from  
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/09/03/death.toll/ (accessed 28 Sep 2007). 
167 United States Department of Transportation, “Airports to Remain Closed, Mineta Says,” Available 
from  http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive_Index/Airports_to_Remain_Closed_Mineta_Says.html (accessed 
14 Sep 2007). 
168 Ibid.  
 32
knives or cutting instruments on board, regardless of the blade size.169   Fighter caps were 
activated across the nation and NATO deployed E-3A Airborne Early Warning aircraft to 
patrol the skies over the U.S.  These security implementations were immediate responses, 
but legislation shortly followed that would make significant organizational changes and 
continue to have a dramatic effect on aviation security.  
A. AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT 
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act was passed on November 19, 2001 
and it brought sweeping changes to aviation and transportation security.  Most, if not all 
of the current security measures were either created or redefined by this act; it essentially 
affected every layer of security in aviation.  Two of the most significant changes the act 
instituted were the establishment of a new security organization and the federalization of 
aviation screeners.   
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act created the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) under the Department of Transportation and assigned the head of 
the administration the responsibility of securing all modes of transportation to include 
aviation.  This move was significant because it severed the dual and sometimes 
competing missions of the Federal Aviation Administration, to promote civil air 
transportation while simultaneously ensuring its security.  These two missions were often 
at odds.  Any initiative put forth by FAA to stiffen security was usually rebutted by the 
airlines as being too costly or inducing inefficiency in passenger throughput.  TSA was 
now able to focus solely on aviation security without the need for airline consensus. 
The second significant action of the act was to establish a federal screener 
workforce.  The screener workforce was now hired and trained by TSA in accordance 
with federal standards, not contracted to private companies by the airlines.  TSA was also 
responsible for managing and testing its screener workforce to those standards in order to 
establish uniform screening procedures at all airports.  Screener supervision was also 
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addressed by requiring Federal Security Managers at all U.S. airports.170  The Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 reorganized over 22 agencies and 170,000 employees, including 
realigning TSA under the Department of Homeland Security.171  This move strengthened 
the weight of the newly created Transportation Security Administration, now backed by 
the sole government agency charged with homeland security for all critical infrastructure 
related transportation.  While the Aviation and Transportation Security Act provided the 
nuts and bolts of aviation security, another composed plan of action would provide 
aviation security the foundations of purpose and mission. 
B. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR AVIATION SECURTIY 
The National Strategy for Aviation Security was released on 26 March 2007 
following President Bush’s direction to establish a comprehensive strategy to protect the 
nation from air threats.172  The strategy’s overarching purpose is to align Federal, State, 
local governments and the private sector into a cohesive, active, multi-layered security 
system.173  It seeks to accomplish this in part by establishing national objectives, 
principles and goals in order to secure the aviation system.  These are critical components 
to recognize.  This strategy is what will allow and facilitate securing the aviation system.  
Having a strategy in place that provides general direction reduces the reactive nature of 
past security measures implementations.    
1. Focus and Aim Points 
The Strategy is the overarching plan, and it is supported by seven supporting 
plans each with its own focus.  The Aviation Transportation System Security Plan 
addresses measures being put into place to secure the aviation transportation system.  It 
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also clearly defines roles and responsibilities, which is important given the number of 
government agencies involved.  For example, the Security Plan establishes that TSA is 
responsible for the vetting of passengers and aircrews flying into or out of the country, 
while Customs and Border Patrol is responsible for detecting, identifying and interdicting 
potential air threats.174      
The Aviation Operational Threat Response Plan details immediate or direct action 
responses when either intercept operations, surface to air operations or on board armed 
action is deemed necessary.175  Furthermore, this plan directs the integration of national 
level command centers to facilitate information flow and command decisions, which are 
required as rapidly as events unfold in the air domain.176  This plan also establishes lead 
and supporting agencies, as well as roles and responsibilities depending on the situation 
at hand.  For instance, TSA is exclusively responsible for directing law enforcement 
activity regarding passenger safety onboard still grounded hijacked aircraft once all 
external doors of the aircraft are closed, and until those doors are opened.177  
The Aviation Transportation System Recovery Plan is the third supporting plan, 
and it delineates measures of recovery for the aviation system in the event of attack in 
both economic and operational aspects.178  This plan along with the aforementioned two 
supporting plans make up the three main tiers of response options to counter aviation 
system threats: secure it, destroy the threat if security fails, and recover from the attack 
should one occur.     
The Air Domain Surveillance and Intelligence Plan focuses primarily on 
integrating and sharing intelligence, information and surveillance data in order to create a 
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shared situational awareness among federal, state and local governments as well as 
international agencies.179  The International Aviation Threat Reduction Plan addresses 
countering the acquisition of stand off weapons that could pose a threat to aviation 
operations.180  The remaining two supporting plans, the Domestic Outreach Plan and the 
International Outreach Plan both focus on gaining domestic or international stakeholder 
cooperation in an effort to reduce aviation security vulnerabilities, with the latter plan 
being heavily dependant on the efforts of the State Department.   
These documents as a whole, prescribe an overarching framework to support 
aviation security enhancement.  The strategy provides the foundation upon which security 
enhancements since 9/11 can be built, and many of those enhancements are still in place 
and operational.   
C. IMPLEMENTED MEASURES – WALKING THROUGH THE NEW 
LAYERS 
1. Commercial Passenger Aviation 
The Aviation Transportation System Security Plan designates the first two 
commercial aviation security layers as the Passenger, Employee and Crew Security 
Assurance layer and the Threat Object Screening and Detection layer, the former dealing 
with access to the aviation system and the latter dealing with passenger and baggage 
screening.  The Aviation Operational Threat Response Plan addresses a third layer.  
These re-designated layers are not new, but significant changes have been implemented 
to these layers following 9/11, mainly as a result of the aforementioned Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act.   
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a. Access to Tickets and Terminal 
The Passenger, Employee and Crew Security Assurance layer employs 
multiple security measures in an attempt to limit access to commercial aviation to both 
passengers and employees with non-malicious intent.  The first security measure checks 
passengers against an integrated list of known or suspected terrorists.  Aviation watch 
lists evolved in the 1990s to reduce the terrorist risk to aviation, and to track drug 
smugglers.181  But, different government and intelligence agencies each kept their own 
watch lists, which impeded any type of consolidated effort.182  To correct this problem, 
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act directed TSA to establish database-sharing 
agreements with federal agencies.  These databases would contain the names of persons 
of interest that could pose a risk to transportation or to national security, and TSA was 
required to promulgate that information to airlines.183   
To facilitate the consolidation and distribution of watchlist data, the 
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) was established in December 2003.184  Administered 
by the FBI, the TSC merges information from multiple agencies and intelligence 
organizations into a Terrorist Screening Database that contains over 238,000 records, 
which TSA distributes a subset of to the airlines as no-fly or automatic selectee lists.185  
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employment of the no-fly list “stops people you would not want on your flight,” and 
alluded to the fact that positive no-fly list passenger matches occur multiple times a 
week.186   
Currently however, the airline, not TSA, is still responsible for screening 
passengers against aviation security no-fly and automatic selectee lists.187  TSA is not 
scheduled to take over passenger no-fly list screening until Secure Flight, the next 
automated passenger prescreening program becomes operational in 2008.188  TSA was 
directed to ensure that the next generation Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening 
System, CAPPS II, evaluated all passengers prior to boarding, but this system was 
abandoned in 2004 due to privacy and information data mining concerns.189  As a result, 
CAPS, renamed to the Computer-Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System (CAPPS) is 
still in use today.  However, the system has been modified so that CAPPS selectee’s are 
now subject to further searches of their persons as opposed to just their checked luggage 
as was the case prior to 9/11.190  
Within this security layer, TSA also employs both uniformed and plain 
clothed Behavior Detection Teams modeled after a successful Israeli security tactic.191  
Behavior Detection Teams observe passenger behavior in an effort to identify unique 
behavior cues.192  Behavior Detection Teams receive fifty-six hours of training to detect 
micro-expressions, or subtle facial muscle movements, which may identify suspicious 
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patterns of behavior or intent.193  Behavior observation detection teams have identified 
over 150 people that upon further investigation, were subsequently arrested, crediting the 
success of the program.194  
The second half of the Security Assurance Layer, employee access to the 
aviation system was also heavily scrutinized.  All employees with regular access to 
aircraft and secure areas were required to have background checks which now include 
both a criminal history check coupled with a review of law enforcement databases.195  
Approximately 900,000 airport workers with unescorted access to secure areas underwent 
a fingerprint-based criminal history records check by December 6, 2002.196  And by April 
2004, fingerprint-based checks and watch list verifications were completed for an 
additional 100,000 airport workers who perform duties in sterile areas (the indoor gate 
area past the security check point).197  These same requirements are also required for 
security screeners.198   
Measures to improve access control to secure areas were also improved.  
In October 2007, airports began issuing secure area badges to employees only after 
criminal background checks are complete.199  Also, the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act directed TSA to regularly assess and test access control compliance with 
federal requirements.200   It essentially stipulated that the same level of protection applied 
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to passengers and luggage should also be applied to any individual, goods or vehicles 
requiring entry into a secure area.201  To meet this requirement, TSA performs 
compliance inspections as well as covert testing and vulnerability assessments.202  In 
2004, TSA inspections found a high percentage of airport operators in compliance with 
access control security requirements.203  It is also interesting to note that TSA’s 
inspection technique is one of cooperation when non-compliance issues are discovered.  
Resolution is centered on a cooperative effort to determine why compliance failed and to 
find a solution, as opposed to the use of penalties such as administrative action or civil 
monetary penalties.204 
b. Terminal to Gate 
The Threat Object Screening and Detection layer shifts the focus 
somewhat from detecting persons to detecting objects or weapons.  While Behavior 
Detection Teams and TSA Officers continue to observe and monitor passengers, the 
detection devices at security checkpoints are a significant element of this phase.  Getting 
to the checkpoints however, is now only allowed for ticketed passengers, which is a 
change since 9/11.  This simple security measure was noted in a 2000 GAO 
congressional testimony as a usefully employed measure in five other countries.205  The 
implementation of this measure reduced the volume of persons that required screening, 
while also simultaneously reducing the volume of persons in the follow-on sterile area.  
Transportation Security Officers add an additional security measure by performing travel 
document checks prior to or at the security checkpoint, ensuring the traveler, 
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identification, and airline ticket match, and that the traveler identification is authentic.206  
Again, a simple measure to implement, which reduces the security gap by ensuring the 
ticket purchaser, whose name has been checked against a no-fly list, is the same person as 
the actual traveler.   
Once at the security checkpoint, ticketed traveler compliance is essentially 
required in order to proceed.  Passengers and carry-on luggage are still screened at the 
checkpoint through metal detectors and x-ray machines, however, beginning in 2004, 
TSA required all passengers to remove outer coats and jackets for X-ray before walking 
through the metal detector.207  Computers require removal from carrying cases, and while 
it is not officially required, shoe removal is performed in lieu of facing the penalty of 
secondary screening selection.208   Explosive Trace Detection machines were also 
installed at the checkpoint screening location to screen carry-on baggage for explosives.  
TSA screeners swab the luggage and the swab is then chemically analyzed for explosive 
residue or vapor.209  A passenger designated as a selectee by CAPPS or other TSA 
procedure to receive additional screening, is either screened by hand-wand or a physical 
pat-down and their carry-on items are screened for explosives traces or physically 
searched.210  Passengers whose carry-on baggage alarms the X-ray machine or who trip 
the walkthrough metal detector will receive the additional screening as well.211 
 Carry-on items that were once allowed to pass such as nail files, scissors, 
pocketknives regardless of blade length, matches and lighters containing fuel are 
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prohibited.212  Although pointed scissors with a blade length less than four inches and 
tools less than seven inches in length are now authorized in carry-ons.213  With the 
exception of medication and baby foods, which must be declared, carry-on liquids are 
now only allowed in bottled quantities of three ounces or less, they must fit inside a one-
quart plastic bag, and only one bag is allowed per person.214  TSA implemented this rule 
on 10 August 2006 following the foiled liquid bomb plot at Heathrow airport.  The “three 
ounce bottle and bag rule” still allows a traveler to bring liquids onboard, while also 
mitigating the liquid bomb threat.  TSA felt that if the quantity of liquid allowed is small 
enough, regardless of the liquid type, it would be non-threatening.215  This eliminated the 
need for screeners to determine exactly what type of liquid is in every bottle of carry-on 
luggage.216  Subsequently, if a screener finds the traveler or the contents of the bag 
suspicious, additional screening procedures may be taken such as conducting an 
interview, or closer examination of the travelers’ carry-ons.217  Pat-down searches were 
also authorized as part of the secondary screening process if warranted based on 
observations.218  Random bag searches were also implemented following the Heathrow 
incident, as an additional security measure.219   
Luggage placed in the aircraft belly has always been viewed as a potential 
weak point in aviation security.  100 percent checked baggage screening had always been 
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trumped in lieu of baggage loading efficiency to minimize ground delays and airline 
claims of limited manpower.  Prior to 9/11, only 5 percent of checked baggage was being 
screened for explosives.220  Following 9/11 however, the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act mandated that TSA install explosive detection machines in all commercial 
airports no later that 31 Dec 2002, and that all checked baggage would be screened by 
those systems.221  TSA met the Congressional deadline by deploying more than two 
thousand detection machines by the end of 2002.222  Deployments continued through 
June 2006 amounting to 1,600 Explosive Detection Systems and over 7,000 Explosive 
Trace Detection machines deployed through which all checked bags now pass prior to 
loading.223  TSA has also increased the use of canine patrols trained in the detection of 
explosives.224 
The Threat Object Screening and Detection layer depends not only on 
screening technology, but more so on the persons who operate the machines and the 
checkpoints.  In an effort to alleviate the low performance of private screening efforts, the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act mandated the deployment of federal screeners 
by November 2002.225  The act also required the screeners to be proficient using new 
technology, and that they could recognize new weapons and threats.226  In 2002, the 
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Department of Transportation submitted its federal plan for security screener training.227  
Included in the training were now standardized procedures to search carry-on bags, 
explosive detection machine image interpretation, and methods to detect concealed 
knives.228  Now the checkpoint screening system was not only composed of screeners 
and technology, but now included standardized procedures for how to conduct 
screening.229  These standards now provide a benchmark to measure against during TSA 
covert and overt self-inspections. 
By November of that year, TSA had met its mandated deadline by hiring 
more than 55,000 screeners.230  Federal screeners were now required to be a U.S. citizen, 
speak fluent English, and had to pass a criminal background check.231  In one year, 
federal screeners confiscated nearly five million items ranging from 1.4 million knives to 
nearly 40,000 box cutters.232  TSA’s current screener training program entails three main 
pillars: the basic skill set for passenger and baggage screening, re-currency training, and 
technical training and certification for operating explosive detection devices.233  
Applying the recurrent training concept, federal screeners are now provided with weekly 
reports that identify new aviation threats, and examples of new concealment techniques  
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are also provided.234  Screeners are also given threat briefings before and after each shift 
much the same as the proven military technique used in scenarios facing an operational 
threat.235 
Many additional security measures are purposefully not discussed here 
such as the automated shoe scanner, millimeter wave passenger imaging technology and 
bottled liquid scanners, primarily because these technologies are not fully implemented.  
Many of these systems are deployed at some airports as pilot test beds, but they are not 
yet fully deployed at every airport as a standard equipment compliment to the security 
checkpoint. 
c. Take Off / In-Flight 
Once passengers are on board the aircraft, they have unknowingly entered 
the final layer of response options.  Many of these options fall under the Aviation 
Operational Response Plan, when direct action may be required or implemented.  
Measures such as hardened cockpit doors and Temporary Flight Restrictions provide 
passive security measures, while on board air marshals and armed pilots provide active, 
final measures of on board security.   
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act required the strengthening 
of cockpit doors and locks in an effort to make them impenetrable from the passenger 
side of the door.236  The doors were also ordered to remain closed and locked during 
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than 6,000 aircraft to install reinforced doors by April 2003.237  These standards were 
designed not only to protect cockpits from intrusion, but also from small arms fire and 
fragmentation devices.238 
A second passive security measure used in the final defensive layer is a 
Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR).  Aviation eventually resumed over the U.S., in 
September 2001, however in an attempt to mitigate the risk of another 9/11, TFRs were 
and still are employed to minimize flight traffic over areas of national interest.  A TFR is 
a four dimensional area of airspace defined by height, width, altitude and time in which 
air traffic is restricted to fly into.  FAA or the Department of Defense establish TFRs or 
no-fly areas in the vicinity of or over national monuments, VIP movement areas, or areas 
of high interest such as chemical weapons storage depots.239  Even national events such 
as the Indianapolis 500 or the 2006 Super Bowl warranted the need for a TFR.240  There 
are also standing TFRs over Disneyland and Disney World in addition to the TFR that 
was placed around the nations capitol region that is still in effect.  The second use of a 
TFR is to enhance situational awareness.  By eliminating aircraft movement in a 
particular area, it becomes easier for both FAA controllers and Air Force Air Defense 
Sector personnel to monitor and identify aircraft that violate an active restricted area.  
Should an aircraft penetrate a TFR, direct action may be the only resort available, 
whether that action is from military fighters or armed personnel onboard.           
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act revived the Federal Air 
Marshal force once again.  Thousands of new air marshals were recruited, trained, and 
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deployed daily on twenty thousand domestic flights.241  Non-stop, long distance flights, 
such as those hijacked on 9/11 were designated as a priority to have air marshals 
aboard.242  The security act also permitted law enforcement personnel from federal, state 
and local governments to carry their firearm on board to assist air marshals, essentially 
increasing the size and coverage of the defensive measure.243   
The arming of onboard personnel does not stop with law enforcement and 
Federal Marshals.  The Federal Flight Deck Officer program was also initiated 
authorizing airline pilots to receive specialized training to qualify as an armed Federal 
Flight Deck Officer.244  TSA has been training approximately one hundred officers a 
week, and expanded the program to also include cargo pilots and other flight crew 
members such as flight engineers.245  By 2003, approximately five thousand commercial 
pilots had been trained as a Federal Flight Deck Officer.246 
While Federal Air Marshals and armed pilots provide a direct action 
capability on board commercial passenger aircraft, Department of Defense assets are also 
on standby to provide an added measure of response in a final effort to thwart an aircraft 
hijacking.  Organizationally, Northern Command has been established as a new unified 
command with the responsibility of defending the United States.247  A rejuvenated North 
American Aerospace Defense Command is now the lead agency for Operation Noble 
Eagle, the protection of the Continental U.S. from airborne threats, which include those 
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threats that originate from within U.S. borders.248  With its re-validated mission, 
NORAD’s alert aircraft sites rose to thirty in 2002, up from the seven sites that were 
active on 9/11.249  Military fighters now fly random Combat Air Patrols (CAP) over the 
nation under the control of Air Defense Sectors whose radar picture is now fused with 
FAA’s radars, providing NORAD with an “inward look.”  And by 2005, NORAD’s alert 
fighters had been scrambled nearly 1000 times since 9/11.250  In the first ten months of 
2004 alone, airborne fighters were committed from their CAPs more than 450 times to 
investigate aircraft of interest.251  The Coast Guard as well as the Customs and Border 
Patrol also perform the air intercept mission.252  These direct action measures are the last 
layer of defense against a hijacked aircraft, although one variable remains, the passengers 
onboard. 
There are two additional security measures that are new to this layer, crew 
training and the response of the passengers on board.  Since 9/11, an attitude of no 
tolerance seems to permeate among both passengers and crew.  Flight crew and 
passengers are more active at reporting suspicious behavior and they are more likely to 
take decisive action when threatened.253  The anti-hijack training procedures taught to 
airline crews following September 11, were altered dramatically; pilots are now trained to 
confront and eliminate the hijack threat as opposed to follow the “common strategy” of 
cooperation.254  In 2002, a passenger on a flight from Miami kicked in the bottom of the 
cockpit door and managed to gain partial access into the cockpit until the co-pilot hit him 
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in the head with an axe.255  These changes in hijack training were directed in the Aviation 
and Transportation Security Act and included self-defense training, as well as defensive 
aircraft maneuvers.256   
Passenger tolerance seems to have also been affected.  Prior to 9/11, 
passengers tended to comply more than resist during a hijack event.  In 1991, a 
counterterror study center in Canada released a list of the fifteen things a passenger can 
do during a hijacking, the first was don’t be a hero, the fourth, try to rest, and the sixth, 
don’t try to escape.257  Following the events of 9/11 however, passengers seem to 
translate their lowered tolerance for hijacking into physical reaction.  Such was the case 
of the passengers attempting to overtake the hijackers on Flight 77 after having learned of 
the two World Trade Center impacts on 9/11.  Passengers also came to the aide of a flight 
attendant to successfully subdue shoe bomber Richard Reid on American Airlines Flight 
63 in December 2001.   
9/11 set the stage for our defensive build up of the commercial aviation 
sector.  The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 put forward and 
implemented some of the most significant changes to date within the aviation security 
arena.  From the establishment of new organizations, to the standing, overt, military 
defense operations, aviation security has been riddled with an extensive overhaul.  Even 
passenger attitude is no longer one of compliance, but one of survival.  Every layer of 
aviation security has either been strengthened with additional security measures or new 
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IV. ASSESSING THE EFFORTS 
A. ASSESSMENT 
Pre and post 9/11 security layers have different names and vary in number.  To 
facilitate a security measure comparison, three categories or layers are used to group 
security measures: Access, Physical Security, and Direct Action.  The Access layer 
focuses on security measures to limit access of both passenger and employees to the 
aviation system.  The Physical Screening layer encompasses measures and procedures to 
physically screen passengers, and carried or checked luggage.  And finally, the Direct 
Action layer involves armed intervention and measures to support or prevent airborne 
intervention.   
 
Figure 1.   Risk Management Approach258 
 
Figure 1 illustrates a risk management approach to help focus aviation security 
efforts.259  Three variables are involved, the likelihood of threat, the criticality of the 
asset, and the vulnerability of the system.  Focusing efforts where all three variables meet 
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will aid in using limited resources in the most efficient manner.  This model can also be 
used however, to illustrate the effectiveness of adding or strengthening additional layers 
of security when applied to commercial passenger aviation.  The first two variables, the 
likelihood of the threat and the criticality of the asset remain constant.  The likelihood of 
the threat to commercial aviation, specifically commercial airliners is historically proven 
with over 238 hijacking attempts on U.S. aircraft from 1930-1984 and eighty-seven 
explosions aboard aircraft between 1949 and 1985.260  The criticality of the asset in this 
respect is the commercial airliner, which is of course the means of conveyance and the 
critical cog in the aviation system.  The third variable then, vulnerability of the system 
can be manipulated or reduced through increased measures of security.  Risk, in this case 
the chances of a terrorist attack or hijacking cannot be eliminated, but enhancing 
protection from those existing or potential threats can help reduce risk.261   
Table 1 illustrates the pre and post 9/11 security measures aligned by security 
layer.  The number of security measures within the Access layer has been increased two 
fold with the employment of observation teams and document checkers.  However, 
improvements of existing passenger and employee access measures are more 
predominant in this layer.  Information integration efforts have improved watch list 
screening databases, and more thorough screening procedures have been implemented for 
CAPPS selectees.  Employee criminal background checks and access compliance 
inspections have also strengthened security measures within the Access layer.      
The physical Screening layer carries over four pre 9/11 security measures, X-ray 
and metal detectors, canine patrols, and checked baggage screening, although the latter 
two measures have also been increased or improved.  Screener supervisory oversight has 
been increased, and checkpoint measures have been implemented to reduce person 
throughput, while also increasing the throughput of screened objects (footwear, jackets, 
etc.).  One item not listed but critical nonetheless is the training of the security screeners.  
Screener training has been increased to a minimum of forty hours of classroom training 
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and 60 hours of on-the-job instruction.262  These marked increases coupled with 
standardized procedures and required recurrent training are significant improvements to 
the checkpoint screening system.       
Table 1.   Pre and Post 9/11 Security Measures 
 
The third layer, Direct Action, illustrates a significant number of security measure 
initiatives to reduce system vulnerability.  These measures represent the last chance 
“glove save” effort because if employed, a hijack or terrorist event has or is taking place.  
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PRE 9/11 POST 9/11
No Fly List Integrated No Fly/Automatic Selectee List
CAPS (Select=Checked Luggage Search) CAPPS (Select=Checked Lug & Persons Search)
Behavior Detection Teams
Travel Document Checks
Background Check - Employment History Background Check - Criminal History
Access Control - Limited Access Control - Compliance Inspections
PHYSICAL SCREENING
Only Ticketed Passengers
Increased Prohibited Items List
Metal Detector Metal Detector
X-Ray Carry Ons X-Ray Carry Ons
Outer Garments and Shoes X-rayed
Explosive Trace Detection-Select Carry Ons
Federal Security Manager
Canine Patrols Canine Patrol - Increased
Checked Baggage Screening - Limited Checked Baggage Screening - 100%
DIRECT ACTION
Hardened Cockpit Doors
FAMS - International FAMS
Armed Law Enforcement








If a terrorist hijacker was successful at bypassing the first and second security layers, it 
doubtful another 9/11 scenario could be reduced given the number of protective measure 
on board the aircraft, from crew to passenger.   
Table 1 illustrates the number of security measure improvements put into place 
since 9/11.  Whether in terms initiating new procedures, using new technology or 
increasing and improving previous security measures, the efforts have collectively more 
than doubled the number of security measures contained within the redundant security 
layers.  In terms of layers of protection, there is also one additional layer that while not a 
primary focus of this thesis deserves mention, the Critical Infrastructure protection layer.  
This area is addressed by documents such as The National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 
which sets goals and objectives to secure the nations critical infrastructures, which the 
aviation transportation system is a part.  In terms of aviation security, this “fourth” layer 
represents the last possible effort to dissuade a hijack, not necessarily by measures of 
security or interdiction, but more so by ensuring the aviation system is resilient, and can 
recover and restore service in an effort to mitigate the impact of an attack.   
While many security measures have been implemented since 9/11, the 
transparency of the measure is an additional facet that warrants examination.  The 
deployment of National Guardsmen to every airport to perform complete body searches 
of every traveler prior to entering an airport threshold would surely dissuade a would be 
terrorist from attempting to smuggle explosives on their persons.  While these heavy-
handed measures may dissuade and deter, they of course would not pass civil liberty 
scrutiny.  Security measures that are transparent, meaning less visible to the traveler and 
do not impede the traveling public yet still add a measure of security, strike the optimum 






The Access layer only has two measures that are transparent, No-Fly lists and 
Behavior Detection Teams.  For the Integrated No-Fly list however, transparency 
depends on list accuracy.  
Table 2.   Security Measure Transparency 
 
Within the Physical Screening layer, the majority of measures are not transparent 
to the passenger as expected by the nature of the layer itself.  This is the only layer that 
can interdict a concealed and prohibited carry-on object and as a result is the most 
intrusive.  Finally, all of the measures in the Direct Action layer are transparent with the 
exception of Temporary Flight Restrictions.  TFRs have tended to hamper general 
aviation by impeding or rerouting routes of flight.  In total, 50% of the post 9/11 
implemented measures discussed can be non-apparent to most aviation travelers.  This is 
an important and successful aspect to highlight.  When implementing new security 
measures, the more unobtrusive a measure is while still providing or adding security, the 
more acceptable the measure will be to the traveling public.      
Transparancy
Integrated No Fly/Automatic Selectee List Yes
CAPPS (Select=Checked Lug & Persons Search) No
Behavior Detection Teams Yes
Travel Document Checks No
PHYSICAL SCREENING
Only Ticketed Passengers No
Increased Prohibited Items List No
Metal Detector No
X-Ray Carry Ons No
Outer Garments and Shoes X-rayed No
Explosive Trace Detection-Select Carry Ons No
Federal Security Manager Yes
Canine Patrol - Increased No
Checked Baggage Screening - 100% Yes
Hardened Cockpit Doors Yes
FAMS Yes
Armed Law Enforcement Yes
Federal Flight Deck Officers Yes
NORAD RADAR Improvements Yes
Temporary Flight Restrictions No
Fighter CAPS Yes






There is no doubt that, by comparing the current aviation security system to the 
pre-9/11 security measures, improvements have been made solely in the sheer number of 
measures in place within the different security layers.  The Access layer’s six security 
measures first mitigate ill-intentioned passengers and employees from gaining access to 
aircraft.  The Physical Screening layer’s system of nine screening measures interdicts the 
carry-on of dangerous items onboard commercial aircraft.  The increase in the number of 
security measures alone, reduce the vulnerability of the system.  Additional measures, 
some transparent to the traveler, reinforce multiple layers by adding security redundancy 
within each layer.  As a result, an integrated system of layers cannot be breached by the 
defeat of a single security feature; each layer is a backup for the others, so that 
impermeability of individual layers is not required.263 
1. Measures of Protection 
Complete, impermeable layers are of course the desired effect of a layered 
security system.  But by the very nature that the system is layered implies that layers or 
security measures within a layer can fail or have imperfections.  The new measures 
imparted after 9/11 are no exception.   
a. Access 
The No-Fly lists are the most effective security measure to stop persons 
with questionable backgrounds or intent from boarding aircraft.264  However as 
previously alluded to, difficulties have risen in applying the new expanded No-Fly list.  
Innocent passengers have been stopped from boarding aircraft because their names were 
similar to names on the No-Fly list, such as Senator Ted Kennedy.265  A Former FBI 
agent stated that the No-Fly list had become a cover your rear end document as the list 
                                                 
263 Transportation Research Board, Deterrence, Protection and Preparation: The New Transportation 
Security Imperative, Special Report 270 (Washington D.C.: TRB, 2002), 16. 
264 Bruce Schnier, “Interview with Kip Hawley,” Bruce Schnier Website, Available at 
http://www.schneier.com/interview-hawley.html (accessed 10 Oct 2007). 
265 William J. Krouse and Bart Elias, Terrorist Watchlist Checks and Air Passenger Prescreening, 
(Washington D.C.: CRS, 2006), 4.  
 55
had expanded considerably.266  The airlines, still responsible for vetting passengers 
against the watchlists have no other amplifying information such as a birth date.267  A 
Terrorist Screening Center representative did state that the Watch List is continually 
being scrutinized.268  Constantly maintaining and overhauling a list containing thousands 
of names may continue to provide discrepancies.  Those discrepancies may continue to 
cause false positives to occur, but it does point to the fact that person who’s name 
matches those on the list are being stopped at the outer layer of security.  TSA was also 
mandated to implement its next generation computer automated screening program that 
would allow TSA to take over the screening of passenger names against the No-Fly lists.  
Secure Flight which began development in 2004 after the failed CAPPS II program, is 
not expected to begin operational testing until the end of 2008, and is not anticipated to 
be fully operational until 2010.269 
Once secure area access inspections were instituted, initial compliance 
reports were favorable, however, access control violations do still occur.  In March 2007, 
an airline worker was arrested for using his airline identification to board an aircraft 
carrying a duffel bag containing thirteen handguns, an assault rifle and eight pounds of 
marijuana.270  However, two Federal Air Marshals were also onboard the aircraft.271  
TSA has instituted is surge operations, which deploy security inspectors and additional 
TSA to randomly increase security efforts at a select airport and to inspect current 
operations.272  One area focused on is employee screening and secure area access.  The 
                                                 
266 Steve Kroft, Unlikely Terrorists on No Fly List, CBS News Online, Available from 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/05/60minutes/main2066624.shtml (accessed 23 Oct 2007). 
267Ibid. 
268 Ibid. 
269 Kip Hawley, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on 
Appropriations, United States House of Representatives, 13 Feb 2007. 
270 Jim Ellis, “TSA: Little Danger on Plane With Guns,” ABC News, Available from 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=2934874  (accessed 23 Oct 2007). 
271 Ibid. 
272 Transportation Security Administration, “TSA Ramps Up Employee Screening at Houston 
Airports,” TSA Website,  Available from 
http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2007/press_release_06082007.shtm  (accessed 23 Oct 2007). 
 56
randomness of these actions imparts an unpredictable and unforeseen security measure on 
the employee, thus hopefully inducing security compliance.     
b. Physical Screening 
The federalizing of airport screeners was viewed as a significant and 
important measure to improve the quality of the screener workforce.  Therefore it is 
interesting to note given the push for federalized screeners, that the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act also allowed the opportunity for airports to maintain a 
private security screener workforce.  Privatized security screening programs are currently 
being conducted at nine U.S. airports around the country, one of the largest being San 
Francisco Airport.273  TSA however, is still required to oversee screening operations, and 
the companies can only employ persons who meet the same requirements as federal 
screeners and receive the same pay and benefits.274  An additional stipulation is that the 
screening company must be owned and controlled by a citizen of the United States. 
In the rush to meet the Federalized Screener deadlines set forth by the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, many of the screeners and airport workers 
were hired without background investigations, many with criminal records and over 
eighty with felony convictions.275  In 2003, passengers filed more than 6,700 complaints 
against TSA employees for stealing cash, jewelry, and computers.276  More than 1,200 of 
the original 55,000 screeners that made up the new federal screener force were terminated 
due to a criminal background.277  These initial start up woes have been corrected 
however by use of the implemented background and criminal history checks.       
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Screener problems persist in training as well as operational execution.  
Screener recurrent training, or refresher training, is one of the pillars of the new training 
regimen and is required for screeners three hours a week.278  But due to manning 
shortages, some airports cannot afford to let screeners accomplish recurrent training 
without detracting from screener manning at checkpoints.  As a result, some airport 
screeners are only receiving on average, three hours of recurrent training a month.279 
Screener checkpoint weaknesses continue to be highlighted as well.  A 
recent Government Accountability Office report cited that investigators were able to 
successfully smuggle improvised explosive devices and improvised incendiary devices 
past security checkpoints at nineteen different airports.280  It is important to note, 
however, that most of the screeners executed their duties in accordance with TSA 
procedures and utilized screening technology correctly.281  The test highlighted an 
exploitation of a weakness in policy and TSA procedure as opposed to a fault in screener 
performance.        
c. Direct Action 
The massive stand up of the Federal Air Marshal force following 9/11 
encountered similar problems to the mass federal screener hire.  TSA received more than 
200,000 air marshal applications.282  As a result, many agents were hired and flying 
while still awaiting completions of their required Top-Secret security investigation.283  
Like the screeners, the initial growth problems were remedied, but as a relatively new 
agency, management problems continue.  The upper management echelon at the Federal 
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Air Marshal Service has limited aviation security experience sometimes resulting in less 
than always optimum management decisions regarding FAM operations.284  For 
example, discreet Air Marshal movement procedures through airports and checkpoints 
have yet to be addressed, as current methods are cumbersome enough to compromise Air 
Marshal anonymity.285 
As the new security measures and layers operate and continue to be 
improved, faults will be identified and most likely corrected.  Implementation of all of the 
aforementioned new measures without imperfection is untenable.  In the span of less than 
six years, the security aspect of the aviation transportation system has been completely 
overhauled.  Layers and measures have been added to create additional proverbial 
concentric rings of protection around the target of interest, the commercial airliner.  In the 
aftermath of the causal terrorist act, perhaps another warranted measure of progress is a 
comparison of the current measures to the 9/11 Commission recommendations.         
B. READDRESSING THE 9/11 DEFICIENCIES 
The 9/11 Commission made three major recommendations to enhance or rectify 
the aviation security deficiencies in 2001, implement a strategic plan for the 
transportation sector, improve the use of No-Fly lists, improve the capability to detect 
explosives on persons and improve screener performance.286 
The Transportation Sector-Specific Plan, which supports the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan addresses the requirement for a strategic transportation 
plan.  The transportation plan encompasses six transportation nodes, one of which is the 
aviation sector.  The aviation annex plan identifies roles and missions of government 
agencies involved in securing the aviation system as recommended by the 9/11 
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Commission, as well as outlining the goals to achieve a secure, resilient airline  
system.287  This recommendation has been met. 
The 9/11 Commission also recommended that the improved use of No-Fly and 
Automatic selectee lists should not be delayed while waiting for a system that can replace 
CAPPS, and that TSA should perform the screening functions using the larger set of 
federal government watchlists.288  This recommendation has been met in part, as 
integrated No-Fly and Automatic Selectee lists have been implemented for prepassenger 
screening.  TSA’s role in performing that function however has still not occurred, 
although TSA does manage the distribution of the watchlists to the airlines.  TSA will 
take over the watchlist function once Secure Flight is complete.  As previously 
mentioned, Secure Flight is still in the development phase but is nearing the testing stage.     
The Third Commission recommendation for aviation security was to improve the 
ability to detect explosives on passengers, and that each person selected for additional 
screening should be screened for explosives.289  This recommendation has not been 
fulfilled and the capability to detect explosives being carried on a person is has not been 
fully deployed.  Testing of some technologies has been accomplished however.  In 2006 
TSA installed ninety-seven Explosive Trace Portals at thirty-seven airports which blow 
puffs of air on passengers as they pass through the portal.290  The puffs of air dislodge 
explosive traces from travelers to facilitate detection.  However, problems were identified 
with the technology, which effectively stopped further deployment.291  Other 
technologies being developed are backscatter and millimeter wave body imaging 
technologies, which have not been fielded.   
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The second portion of the third Commission recommendation was for TSA to 
conduct a human factors study in an effort to improve screener performance.292  This 
recommendation was achieved.  TSA did accomplish a comprehensive Passenger 
Screener Performance Improvement Study, which focused on human factors, and the 
findings were used to implement improvements to increase screener performance.293  In 
2006, TSA implemented a performance management system, which now compensates 
screeners based upon technical proficiency, training and development, customer service 
skills, teamwork, professionalism, and leadership.294  TSA also implemented a career 
progression program to provide advancement opportunities and pay advancement in an 
effort to provide incentive and to retain experienced individuals.295 
With the exception of meeting the recommendation to detect explosives on 
individuals and taking over the No-Fly list screening, TSA has met the 9/11 
recommendations mentioned above.  Both of the aforementioned unfulfilled requirements 
are being addressed however with ongoing testing of pilot technologies.  Improving or 
maintaining screener performance will most likely continue to be an ongoing 
performance issue.  Due to monotony and routine, there is always the risk that after 
checking so many people and bags, screeners will tend to grow somewhat complacent.296 
C. WHERE TO FOCUS EFFORTS 
Given the aviation security measures put into effect, where should efforts be 
focused now?  Look out, look forward and look around.  Efforts must look out beyond 
the outermost layer.  The outer layer discussed in this thesis was the Access layer 
pertaining to domestic aviation and passenger No-Fly lists.  Looking further outward, 
however, No-Fly lists on international flights either inbound or outbound are vetted in a 
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similar fashion as domestic flights by Customs and Border Protection.  This is where the 
next security layer begins, international cooperation.  This layer is addressed in the 
International Outreach Plan, supporting plan to the National Strategy for Aviation 
Security.  And while intelligence and information sharing efforts have been strengthened 
since 9/11, international cooperation and comparative security efforts need to be 
maintained if we are to attempt to interdict the threat before they can even reach the 
Access layer.  Establishing and implementing the International Outreach Plan adds 
another defensive layer.  This layer can superimpose all of our domestic layers upon 
international airports, if the same domestic standards can be applied abroad.   
Security efforts must also continue to look forward.  Efforts must be proactive.  A 
security plan built solely on reactive security measures will only build a hodge-podge of 
non-integrated efforts.  The 9/11 Commission noted this same conclusion, characterizing 
the security system in place on 9/11, “Most of the aviation security system’s features had 
developed in response to specific incidents, rather than in anticipation.”297  To 
accomplish this however, security must stay ahead of the threat.  Red Teaming can help 
achieve this goal as long as they are allowed to exploit aviation security weaknesses with 
innovative and unrestricted measures, and their efforts are looked at with support as 
opposed to adversarial.  Terrorists analyze defenses.298  Red Teams can do the same and 
highlight weaknesses to force the aviation security system to continually evolve.  It is the 
difference between active improvement and reassessment versus stagnate procedures.   
Besides looking out to stop the threat at the outermost layer, and looking forward 
to preempt the next aviation threat, aviation security efforts must continue to look around 
the entire security system of layers and measures as a whole.  One area, layer, or measure 
cannot become the next focal point at the expense of the deterioration of the other  
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measures and layers.  A strong base level of security needs to be evenly applied so as not 
to create gaps by over-focusing on one area.299  The whole aviation security system must 
remain a focal point of continuous improvement. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The Aviation Transportation System has continued to persevere against multiple 
hijack and terrorist incidents.  With each incident, security improvements became the 
highest priority.  Both security legislation and security measures addressed security 
deficiencies in an effort to improve aviation security, or at least address the security gaps 
from the previous aviation incident.  The initial efforts laid the foundation for future 
security initiatives, employing the use of metal detectors, X-ray machines and armed sky 
marshals.  Government official were charged to improve and increase security with 
varying degrees of success, but security vulnerabilities continued to exist, and continued 
to be exploited.  Following each major incident, given the distance of time and the 
perception of a lessened threat, the priority of aviation security usually stagnated or 
dwindled, overshadowed by both economic cost and traveler convenience.  Aviation 
security was systemically hindered by saddling the airlines with the responsibility and 
cost of security, coupled with the conflicting Federal Aviation Administration missions.  
It unfortunately took a monumental and tragic event to change these two barriers.     
September 11 marked a turning point for aviation security.  Never have so many 
security enhancements been implemented, from legal, to policy, to procedural, to 
technological.  Almost every aspect of the aviation security system was overhauled.  The 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act that was passed following 9/11 erected and 
reorganized organizations solely responsible for transportation security.  The dual 
competing missions of the Federal Aviation Administration have finally been severed, 
alleviating the Federal Aviation Administration of the responsibility to secure and 
safeguard the system.  While the Transportation Security Administration certainly weighs  
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each new security measure against passenger throughput and inconvenience, security is 
the priority, and it no longer competes on equal ground against commercial aviation 
interests.   
A national aviation security strategy has also been developed to guide current and 
future security initiatives.  A national strategy mitigates the pre-9/11 reactive security 
measure approach in an effort to preempt future security threats or vulnerabilities.  The 
strategy also emphasizes a combined effort approach by enlisting the aid of not only 
federal, but also state and local governments that may be involved in, or respond to 
another aviation related hijack or terrorist incident.    
Following 9/11, security layers were redefined and reinforced and a multitude of 
security measures have been added to provide redundant and tertiary measures of 
security.  With the exception of a few major airports, the federal security screener 
initiative has alleviated the commercial, cost driven security screening companies from 
commercial aviation.  Security screening policies and measures are now in the hands of 
the federal government in an effort to bring standardization and regulation to the 
screening workforce.  Advanced technologies are being developed to refine passenger no-
fly list matching, TSA officers are being trained in behavior observation techniques and 
screening procedures are being continually adjusted and fine tuned based on operational 
feedback, recent threats or undercover agent exposed vulnerabilities.  Onboard the 
aircraft, security measures have not only included structural enhancements to cockpit 
doors or armed undercover federal marshals, but it has also permeated to the passengers 
and crew.  Aircrew training that once emphasized crew compliance in response to an 
onboard hijack event has been replaced with overt action in an attempt to regain control 
of the aircraft.  And if the passenger response to shoe bomber Richard Reid in 2001 is an 
indicator of post 9/11 passenger reactions, then passenger compliance has also been 
replace with overt action.  The closer the potential aviation terrorist gets to his goal of 
gaining control of an aircraft and passengers, the more drastic the response measures will 
be.                   
Department of Defense fighters are now armed and trained to shoot down civilian 
airliners should the situation and need arise.  An unthinkable security measure prior to 
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9/11, it is a last chance measure to protect U.S. critical infrastructure and avert a 9/11 
reenactment.  NORAD fighters have resumed alert postures at an increased number of 
bases around the country, but the inbound Russian bomber scenario has been replaced 
with the rogue airliner.  The nation has also been moved to address critical infrastructure 
protection, should armed intervention from either U.S. fighters, or onboard armed 
officers fail.   
Aviation security has been enhanced since 9/11, and the vulnerability of the 
system reduced by the application of so many additional barriers.  Many of the security 
measures are not transparent to the every day traveler.  The most notable overt layer is 
the physical screening layer, which has actually been in place since the 1970’s.  The 
transparency of this layer diminishes considerably in the face of newly implemented 
procedures for passengers passing through this layer.  This layer also seems to gain the 
most attention when security procedures go awry.   
While there may have been some setbacks in implementation, the new and refined 
security measures remain in place.  No system is perfect, and security breaches in the 
future will most likely continue to occur.  The government investigative teams that 
smuggled improvised explosive devices past security screeners earlier this year 
reinforced this fact.  The media highlighted the failure, and will continue to highlight 
future failures.  The aspect that has failed to be captured, however, is that each successive 
breach of security by teams from the Government Accountability Office or from TSA’s 
red teams, can only strengthen the security system as a whole.  Each successive breach 
will allow TSA the opportunity to improve a found weakness in policy, procedure, 
personnel or technology.  These cannot be viewed as setbacks, but instead as waypoints 
for future security measures to meet and surpass.  Media reports of security breaches also 
create an additional benefit, the attention garnered keeps aviation security at the forefront 
of public concern.  This is perhaps the most difficult feat to accomplish.  
Aviation security in the past has been cyclic in nature.  After each aviation 
incident, security weaknesses are identified, and improvements are promised or 
developed with some degree of implementation.  Over time, however, as security 
violations lessen, and the perception of the threat diminishes, security wanes or fails.  
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Building additional security layers and measures is fairly easy, especially in the wake of a 
monumental terrorist attack.  What will be necessary now, and arguably more difficult to 
attain, is the perseverance to maintain the newly established security efforts as we move 
further away from September 11, 2001.    
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